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An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution. (English) Zbl 1280.91018
Summary: I prove that ‘disagreement point convexity’ and ‘midpoint domination’ characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the class of two-player bargaining problems and on the class of smooth bargaining problems. I propose an example to show that these two axioms do not characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the class of bargaining problems with more than two players. I prove that the other solutions that satisfy these two properties are not lower hemi-continuous. These different results refine the analysis of Y. Chun [Econ. Lett. 34, No. 4, 311–316 (1990; Zbl 0722.90089)]. I also highlight a rather unexpected link with the result of N. Dagan et al. [Soc. Choice Welfare 19, No. 4, 811–823 (2002; Zbl 1072.91505)].
Reviewer: Reviewer (Berlin)

MSC:
91A12 Cooperative games
91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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