zbMATH — the first resource for mathematics

An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game. (English) Zbl 1271.91032
Summary: A recent experimental study of H. Cai and J. T.-Y. Wang [Games Econ. Behav. 56, No. 1, 7–36 (2006; Zbl 1150.91008)] on strategic information transmission reveals that subjects tend to transmit more information than predicted by the standard equilibrium analysis. To evidence that this overcommunication phenomenon can be explained in terms of a tension between normative social behavior and incentives for lying, we show in a simple sender-receiver game that subjects incurring in costs to punish liars tell the truth more often than predicted by the logit agent quantal response equilibria whereas subjects that do not punish liars after receiving a deceptive message play, on the aggregate, equilibrium strategies. Thus, we can partition the subject pool into two groups, one group of subjects with preferences for truth-telling and one taking into account only material incentives.

91A90 Experimental studies
91A28 Signaling and communication in game theory
91A40 Other game-theoretic models
Full Text: DOI
[1] Alingham, M.; Sandmo, A., Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis, J. public econ., 1, 323-338, (1972)
[2] Blume, A.; DeJong, D.; Kim, Y.; Sprinkle, G., Experimental evidence on the evolution of meaning of messages in sender – receiver games, Amer. econ. rev., 88, 1323-1339, (1998)
[3] Bolton, G.; Ockenfels, A., ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition, Amer. econ. rev., 90, 166-193, (2000)
[4] Brandts, J.; Charness, G., Truth or consequence: an experiment, Manage. sci., 49, 116-130, (2003) · Zbl 1232.91097
[5] Cai, H.; Wang, J., Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games, Games econ. behav., 95, 384-394, (2006) · Zbl 1150.91008
[6] Costa-Gomes, M.; Crawford, V.; Broseta, B., Cognition and behavior in normal form games: an experimental study, Econometrica, 69, 1193-1235, (2001)
[7] Crawford, V., Lying for strategic advantages: rational and boundedly rational misrepresentations of intentions, Amer. econ. rev., 93, 133-149, (2003)
[8] Crawford, V.; Sobel, J., Strategic information transmission, Econometrica, 50, 1431-1451, (1982) · Zbl 0494.94007
[9] Dickhaut, J.; McCabe, K.; Mukherji, A., An experimental study of strategic information transmission, Econ. theory, 6, 389-403, (1995) · Zbl 0840.90042
[10] Duffy, J.; Feltovich, N., Do actions speak louder than words? observation vs. cheap talk as coordination devices, Games econ. behav., 39, 1-27, (2002) · Zbl 1015.91510
[11] Duffy, J.; Feltovich, N., Words, deeds and lies: strategic behavior in games with multiple signals, Rev. econ. stud., 73, 669-688, (2006) · Zbl 1145.91306
[12] Fehr, E.; Gacther, S., Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments, Amer. econ. rev., 90, 980-994, (2000)
[13] Fehr, E.; Schmidt, K., A theory of fairness competition, and cooperation, Quart. J. econ., 114, 817-864, (1999) · Zbl 0944.91022
[14] Fischbacher, U., 1999. Z-Tree—Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments—Experimenter’s manual. Working paper Nr. 21. Institute of Empirical Research in Economics, Zurich University
[15] Galor, E., Information sharing in oligopoly, Econometrica, 53, 329-343, (1985) · Zbl 0578.90008
[16] Gneezy, U., Deception: the role of consequences, Amer. econ. rev., 95, 384-394, (2005)
[17] Heidhues, P.; Lagerlof, J., Hiding information in electoral competition, Games econ. behav., 42, 48-74, (2003) · Zbl 1048.91024
[18] McKelvey, R.; Palfrey, T., Quantal response equilibria in normal form games, Games econ. behav., 10, 6-38, (1995) · Zbl 0832.90126
[19] McKelvey, R.; Palfrey, T., Quantal response equilibria in extensive form games, Exper. econ., 1, 9-41, (1998) · Zbl 0920.90141
[20] Morgan, J.; Stocken, P., An analysis of stock recommendations, RAND J. econ., 34, 183-203, (2003)
[21] Nagel, R., Unraveling in guessing games: an experimental study, Amer. econ. rev., 85, 1313-1326, (1995)
[22] Sen, A., Maximization and the act of choice, Econometrica, 65, 745-779, (1997) · Zbl 0891.90013
[23] Zwick, R.; Chen, X., What price fairness? A bargaining study, Management sci., 44, 119-141, (1999)
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.