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Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. (English) Zbl 1259.91025

Summary: We examine an evolutionary model in which the mutation rate varies with the strategy. J. Bergin and {B. L. Lipman} [Econometrica 64, No.4, 943–956 (1996; Zbl 0862.90142)] showed that equilibrium selection using stochastic evolutionary processes depends on the specification of mutation rates. We offer a characterization of how mutation rates determine the selection of Nash equilibria in \(2 \times 2\) symmetric coordination games for single and double limits of the small mutation rate and the large population size. We prove that the restrictions on mutation rates which ensure that the risk-dominated equilibrium is selected are the same for both orders of limits.

MSC:

91A22 Evolutionary games
91B50 General equilibrium theory
91B51 Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium theory

Citations:

Zbl 0862.90142
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References:

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