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Opinion dynamics and learning in social networks. (English) Zbl 1214.91091
Summary: We provide an overview of recent research on belief and opinion dynamics in social networks. We discuss both Bayesian and non-Bayesian models of social learning and focus on the implications of the form of learning (e.g., Bayesian vs. non-Bayesian), the sources of information (e.g., observation vs. communication), and the structure of social networks in which individuals are situated on three key questions: (1) whether social learning will lead to consensus, i.e., to agreement among individuals starting with different views; (2) whether social learning will effectively aggregate dispersed information and thus weed out incorrect beliefs; (3) whether media sources, prominent agents, politicians and the state will be able to manipulate beliefs and spread misinformation in a society.

MSC:
91D30 Social networks; opinion dynamics
91A26 Rationality and learning in game theory
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