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Parallel and concurrent security of the HB and \(HB^{+}\) protocols. (English) Zbl 1201.94090
N. Hopper and M. Blum [Secure human identification protocols. Advances in cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2001. 7th international conference on the theory and application of cryptology and information security, Gold Coast, Australia. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 2248, 52–66 (2001; Zbl 1062.94549)] and A. Juels and S. A. Weis [Authenticating pervasive devices with human protocols. Advances in cryptology – CRYPTO 2005. 25th annual international cryptology conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA 2005. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3621, 293–308 (2005; Zbl 1145.94470)] proposed the shared-key authentication protocols \(HB\) and \(HB^+\), respectively. Their extremely low computational cost make them attractive for low-cost devices such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags. The security of these protocols is based on the conjectured hardness of the “learning parity with noise” (LPN) problem, which is equivalent to the problem of decoding random binary linear codes. In this paper, the \(HB\) protocol is proven secure against a passive (eavesdropping) adversary and the \(HB^+\) protocol is proven secure against active attacks.

94A60 Cryptography
94A62 Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing
Full Text: DOI
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