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Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching. (English) Zbl 1201.91144
The relatively brief note is devoted to the matching market models. Its main contribution consists in the suggestion of the first algorithm for finding of the complete set of stable matchings in any many-to-one matching. It follows from a reduction of the known matching problem to its modification with “preferences over colleagues”. The main results regard the inspirational relation between the complexities of the matching problems with and without preferences over colleagues.

91B68 Matching models
Full Text: DOI
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