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Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome. (English) Zbl 1155.91317
Summary: A collective choice problem–essentially a bargaining problem without disagreement outcome–is studied. An extended solution, which determines a solution and a reference point simultaneously, is characterized. The unique extended solution that meets the extended versions of Pareto-optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, symmetry, and scale invariance maximizes the Nash product with respect to both the solution and the reference point.
Reviewer: Reviewer (Berlin)

MSC:
91A12 Cooperative games
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