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Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs. (English) Zbl 1142.91343
Summary: We consider a simple model of stochastic evolution in population games. In our model, each agent occasionally receives opportunities to update his choice of strategy. When such an opportunity arises, the agent selects a strategy that is currently optimal, but only after his payoffs have been randomly perturbed. We prove that the resulting evolutionary process converges to approximate Nash equilibrium in both the medium run and the long run in three general classes of population games: stable games, potential games, and supermodular games. We conclude by contrasting the evolutionary process studied here with stochastic fictitious play.

##### MSC:
 91A22 Evolutionary games 37N40 Dynamical systems in optimization and economics 91A15 Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
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##### References:
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