Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask).

*(English)*Zbl 1136.91542Summary: In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm [cf. A. E. Roth and E. Peranson, The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: some engineering aspects of economic design. Am. Econ. Rev. 89, 748–780 (1999)]. First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when couples’ preferences are ‘responsive’, i.e., when D. Gale and L. S. Shapley [Am. Math. Mon. 69, 9–15 (1962; Zbl 0109.24403)] deferred acceptance algorithm (on which the old NRMP algorithm is based) is applicable. Second, we demonstrate that the new NRMP algorithm may also be anipulated by couples acting as singles.

##### MSC:

91B68 | Matching models |

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\textit{B. Klaus} et al., Rev. Econ. Des. 11, No. 3, 175--184 (2007; Zbl 1136.91542)

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##### References:

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