An equilibrium model for urban transit assignment based on game theory.

*(English)*Zbl 1121.90029Summary: The urban public transport system is portrayed as a special commodity market where the passenger is consumer, the transit operator is producer and the special goods is the service of the passenger’s trip. The generalized Nash equilibrium game is applied to describe how passengers adjust their route choices and trip modes. We present a market equilibrium model for urban public transport system as a series of mathematical programmings and equations, which is to describe both the competitions among different transit operators and the interactive influences among passengers. The proposed model can simultaneously predict how passengers choose their optimal routes and trip modes. An algorithm is designed to obtain the equilibrium solution. Finally, a simple numerical example is given and some conclusions are drawn.

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\textit{L. Sun} and \textit{Z. Gao}, Eur. J. Oper. Res. 181, No. 1, 305--314 (2007; Zbl 1121.90029)

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