Aoyagi, Masaki Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. (English) Zbl 1107.91024 Econ. Theory 25, No. 2, 455-475 (2005). Summary: This paper studies repeated games with imperfect private monitoring when there exists a third-party mediator who coordinates play by giving non-binding instructions to players on which action to take and by collecting their private information. The paper presents a Nash-threat folk theorem for a communication equilibrium based on such mediation when monitoring is jointly \(\epsilon\)-perfect in the sense that every player is almost perfectly monitored collectively by other players. Cited in 4 Documents MSC: 91A20 Multistage and repeated games 91A10 Noncooperative games 91A28 Signaling and communication in game theory Keywords:Repeated games; Private monitoring; Joint monitoring; Communication; Mediation PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{M. Aoyagi}, Econ. Theory 25, No. 2, 455--475 (2005; Zbl 1107.91024) Full Text: DOI Link