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Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria. (English) Zbl 1100.91004
Summary: This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions. These sufficient conditions unify and generalize existing sufficient conditions. Our generalization of potential games is useful in other game theoretic problems where potential methods have been applied.

##### MSC:
 91A10 Noncooperative games 90C47 Minimax problems in mathematical programming
##### Keywords:
Incomplete information; Potential; Refinements; Robustness
Full Text:
##### References:
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