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Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring. (English) Zbl 1056.91007

Summary: We study repeated games with discounting where perfect monitoring is possible, but costly. It is shown that if players can make public announcements, then every payoff vector which is an interior point in the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs can be implemented in a sequential equilibrium of the repeated game when the discount factor is high enough. Thus, efficiency can be approximated even when the cost of monitoring is high, provided that the discount factor is high enough.

MSC:

91A20 Multistage and repeated games
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