Ma, Jinpeng Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem. (English) Zbl 1055.91003 Rev. Econ. Des. 7, No. 2, 117-134 (2002). This paper studies the problem of misrepresentation in a class of stable matching mechanisms in the college admissions problem (including marriage as a special case). The paper shows that in such a problem, although examples exist in which rematching-proof or strong equilibrium outcomes are unstable with respect to true preferences, rematching-proof or strong equilibrium outcomes in truncations at the match point are stable, and all stable matchings can be supported by both rematching-proof and strong equilibrium in truncations at the match point. The paper also shows that every Nash equilibrium profile admits at most one true stable matching. Reviewer: Sheng Cheng Hu (Nankang) Cited in 10 Documents MSC: 91A12 Cooperative games 91B68 Matching models 91A10 Noncooperative games Keywords:matching; Nash equilibrium; college admission problem PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{J. Ma}, Rev. Econ. Des. 7, No. 2, 117--134 (2002; Zbl 1055.91003) Full Text: DOI Link