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Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods. (English) Zbl 1054.91032
Summary: The exchange of heterogeneous indivisible goods is considered among agents with responsive preferences, who may be endowed with several goods. We introduce the segmented trading cycle rules which allow the agents to trade goods, one-for-one, subject to market segmentation. In particular, the market is divided into segments such that each agent in each segment may trade at most one good. The segmented trading cycle rules are characterized by four axioms: strategyproofness, nonbossiness, trade sovereignty, and strong individual rationality.

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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