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Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities. (English) Zbl 1035.91006
The author proposes a solution for the evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities. A number of theorems and proofs are developed for the theoritical foundation. No numerical experiments are performed. The developed model could be used for experimentation in future.

MSC:
91A10 Noncooperative games
91A22 Evolutionary games
91D10 Models of societies, social and urban evolution
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