Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction.

*(English)*Zbl 1019.91001
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, xv, 550 p. (2003).

This book describes a large and rapidly growing body of experiments designed to address two major concerns of game theory, namely, game theory assumes more calculation and perceived rationality of others, secondly, it interact with rational people with modest amount of emperical evidence. The experiments developed in the book suggest that game-theoretic principles predict the behaviour. The eventual goal is for game theorists to accept behavioral game theory as useful and necessary. An interesting result that comes in this book is not a scolding catalog of how poorly game theory describes choices. In fact the results are uniformly mixed in a way that encourages the view that better theory is close at hand. It is also stated by the author that it is easy to modify theories to self-interested people and infinite step becomes finite while preserving the central principle in game theory. This book can be used as text in undergraduate courses in game theory and experimental economic pattern. In short, it is an excellent innovative work by the author.

Reviewer: Prabhat Kumar Mahanti (Saint John, NB)