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A differential game approach to evolutionary equilibrium selection. (English) Zbl 1017.91009

The authors deal with the problem of equilibrium selection: if a game has several equilibria, how can one determine which one to choose? In the paper under review, they investigate a model of rational players with perfect foresight due to A. Matsui and K. Matsuyama [J. Econ. Theory 65, 415-434 (1995; Zbl 0835.90121)] for \(N\)-player games, and derive results for games with a \(\frac{1}{2}\)-dominan equilibrium (Section 4.1), for games with a potential function (Section 4.2) and for supermodular games (Section 4.3). Their results in Section 4.2 extend their own research from [J. Econ. Theory 85, 1-23 (1999; Zbl 0922.90146)] to \(N\)-person games (Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.2).

MSC:

91A23 Differential games (aspects of game theory)
91A06 \(n\)-person games, \(n>2\)
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