Sandler, Todd; Vicary, Simon Weakest-link public goods: Giving in-kind or transferring money in a sequential game. (English) Zbl 1001.91024 Econ. Lett. 74, No. 1, 71-75 (2001). Summary: This paper extends the leader-follower analysis of a weakest-link public good by permitting an agent to provide the good on one’s own territory or on another’s territory through an in-kind transfer. An equilibrium with cash transfers, followed by in-kind transfers from the income recipient, may be Pareto superior. Any cash transfers must be from the follower to the leader for welfare to improve. Cited in 4 Documents MSC: 91B18 Public goods 91A20 Multistage and repeated games Keywords:public goods; Stackelberg leader-follower; weakest-link; income transfers; neutrality PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{T. Sandler} and \textit{S. Vicary}, Econ. Lett. 74, No. 1, 71--75 (2001; Zbl 1001.91024) Full Text: DOI References: [1] Hirshleifer, J., From weakest-link to best shot: the voluntary provision of public goods, Public Choice, 41, 371-386 (1983) [2] Hirshleifer, J., From weakest-link to best-shot: correction, Public Choice, 46, 221-223 (1985) [3] Vicary, S., Sandler, T., 2002. Weakest-link public goods: giving in-kind or transferring money. European Economic Review, in press.; Vicary, S., Sandler, T., 2002. Weakest-link public goods: giving in-kind or transferring money. European Economic Review, in press. · Zbl 1001.91024 This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.