zbMATH — the first resource for mathematics

Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution. (English) Zbl 0914.90280
Summary: Under the decision rule specified by M. Kandori, G. J. Mailath and R. Rob [Econometrica 61, No. 1, 29-56 (1993; Zbl 0776.90095)], myopic adjustment can lead to surprising results, including coordination on strictly dominated strategies. We show that under an alternative decision rule, convergence to Nash equilibrium is guaranteed. Moreover, if rare mutations are introduced, risk dominant equilibria always correspond to long run equilibria.

91A20 Multistage and repeated games
92D15 Problems related to evolution
91E40 Memory and learning in psychology
91A35 Decision theory for games
Full Text: DOI
[1] Kandori, M; Mailath, G.J; Rob, R, Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games, Econometrica, 61, 29-56, (1993) · Zbl 0776.90095
[2] Kandori, M; Rob, R, Evolution of equilibria in the long run: a general theory and applications, Journal of economic theory, 65, 383-414, (1995) · Zbl 0837.90139
[3] Rhode, P; Stegeman, M, A comment on ‘learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games’, Econometrica, 64, 443-449, (1996) · Zbl 0873.90132
[4] Sandholm, W.H., 1996. Simple and clever decision rules in single population evolutionary models. CMS-EMS Discussion Paper #1158, Northwestern University.
[5] Sandholm, W.H., 1998. Evolutionary justification of Nash equilibrium. Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University.
[6] Young, H.P, The evolution of conventions, Econometrica, 61, 57-84, (1993) · Zbl 0773.90101
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.