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Information disaggregation and incentives for non-collusive information sharing. (English) Zbl 0913.90078
Summary: When shocks to demand intercepts are not perfectly correlated, we show by example that sharing non-anonymous, disaggregated information is sometimes a Nash equilibrium. It also improves consumers’ surplus and total welfare. This contradicts conclusions based on perfectly correlated shocks.
91B44 Economics of information
Full Text: DOI
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