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Iterated expectations and common priors. (English) Zbl 0910.90285

Summary: A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior for several players is given in terms of the players’ present beliefs only. A common prior exists iff for each random variable it is common knowledge that all its iterated expectations converge to the same value; this value is its expectation with respect to the common prior. The proof is based on the presentation of type functions as Markov matrices. \(\copyright\) 1998 Academic Press.

MSC:

91A35 Decision theory for games
91B06 Decision theory
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References:

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