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The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. (English) Zbl 0904.90182
Bicchieri, Cristina (ed.) et al., The dynamics of norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. 1-16 (1997).
Summary: This paper employs ideas from genetics to study the evolution of strategies in games. In complex environments, individuals are not fully able to analyze the situation and calculate their optimal strategy. Instead they can be expected to adapt their strategy over time based upon what has been effective and what has not. The genetic algorithm is demonstrated in the context of a rich social setting, the environment formed by the strategies submitted to a prisoner’s dilemma computer tournament. The results of the evolutionary process show that the genetic algorithm has a remarkable ability to evolve sophisticated and effective strategies in a complex environment.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 0889.00016].

91A20 Multistage and repeated games
91E40 Memory and learning in psychology