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On flexibility in oligopoly. (English) Zbl 0900.90076
Summary: This paper demonstrates that, even when firms’ initial moves are simultaneous, the mere opportunity to wait out the opponent’s move may be as harmful as a second-mover disadvantage.

91B38 Production theory, theory of the firm
91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Full Text: DOI
[1] Asheim, Geir B., 1988, Personal communication.
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