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Communication, risk, and efficiency in games. (English) Zbl 0896.90180
Summary: This paper uses curb sets to study the evolution of effective pre-play communication in games, where a single communication round precedes a simultaneous-move, complete-information game. It is shown that the effectiveness of one-sided pre-play communication is inversely related to risk in the underlying game, and to the size of the message space. If messages have some a priori information content, then multi-sided communication is more effective than one-sided communication; i.e., risk and the size of the message space play no role.

MSC:
91A05 2-person games
91A10 Noncooperative games
91B44 Economics of information
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