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Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues. (English) Zbl 0892.90049
Summary: In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one’s co-workers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institutions.

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Full Text: DOI
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