Ben-Porath, Elchanan; Kahneman, Michael Communication in repeated games with private monitoring. (English) Zbl 0871.90134 J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 281-297 (1996). Summary: The paper considers repeated games where each player can be observed by only a subset of the other players, and where players can make public announcements about the behavior of the players they observed. We address the following question: What is the minimal level of observability that is required to obtain efficient outcomes? The main result is that the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs, when the discount factor tends to one, contains the set of individual rational payoffs whenever each player is observed by at least two or other players. Cited in 1 ReviewCited in 33 Documents MSC: 91A20 Multistage and repeated games 91A28 Signaling and communication in game theory Keywords:repeated games; sequential equilibrium payoffs PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{E. Ben-Porath} and \textit{M. Kahneman}, J. Econ. Theory 70, No. 2, 281--297 (1996; Zbl 0871.90134) Full Text: DOI