zbMATH — the first resource for mathematics

Equilibrium selection in stag hunt games. (English) Zbl 0807.90138
Binmore, Ken (ed.) et al., Frontiers of game theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 237-253 (1993).
A stag hunt game is an \(n\)-person symmetric binary choice game. Each player can play either a safe strategy that yields a certain payoff irrespective of what the opponents do, or a risky strategy that yields a payoff that increases monotonically with the number of players that follow this strategy. There are two strict Nash equilibria, viz. the two symmetric pure strategy profiles. For such a game, we compute and compare the solutions according to the equilibrium selection theories of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), Güth and Kalkofen (1989) and Güth (1990). A further comparison is obtained by applying the global payoff uncertainty approach of Carlsson and Van Damme (1990). If there are two players all solutions coincide, but if the number of players exceeds two, then, in general, all solutions differ.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 0795.00024].

91A10 Noncooperative games
91A12 Cooperative games