Ma, Jinpeng Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities. (English) Zbl 0804.90014 Int. J. Game Theory 23, No. 1, 75-83 (1994). Summary: We show that, in markets with indivisibilities (typified by the Shapley- Scarf housing market), the strict core mechanism is categorically determined by three assumptions: individual rationality, Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness. Cited in 2 ReviewsCited in 62 Documents MSC: 91B50 General equilibrium theory 91B14 Social choice Keywords:Shapley-Scarf housing market; markets with indivisibilities; strict core mechanism; individual rationality; Pareto optimality; strategy-proofness PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{J. Ma}, Int. J. Game Theory 23, No. 1, 75--83 (1994; Zbl 0804.90014) Full Text: DOI References: [1] Bird CG (1984) Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Economics Letters 14: 309-313 · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(84)90003-X [2] Postlewaite A, Roth AE (1977) Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. Journal of Mathematical Economics 4: 131-137 · Zbl 0368.90025 · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(77)90004-0 [3] Roth AE (1982) Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Economics letters 9: 127-132 · Zbl 0722.90009 · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(82)90003-9 [4] Shapley LS, Scarf H (1974) On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1: 23-37 · Zbl 0281.90014 · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0 [5] Wako J (1991) Some properties of weak domination in an exchange market with indivisible goods. The Economic Studies Quarterly 42(4): 303-314 · Zbl 0747.90022 This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.