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Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities. (English) Zbl 0804.90014
Summary: We show that, in markets with indivisibilities (typified by the Shapley- Scarf housing market), the strict core mechanism is categorically determined by three assumptions: individual rationality, Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness.

MSC:
91B50 General equilibrium theory
91B14 Social choice
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References:
[1] Bird CG (1984) Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Economics Letters 14: 309-313 · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(84)90003-X
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