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The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction. (English) Zbl 0797.90123
Author’s abstract: “I study strategic interaction among players who live on a lattice. Each player interacts directly with only a finite set of neighbors, but any two players indirectly interact through a finite chain of direct interactions. I examine various stochastic strategy revision processes, including (myopic) best response and stochastic choice. I discuss both stationary distributions and the limit behavior of these Markov processes. Stationary distributions are partially characterized, and the asymptotic behavior of stochastic choice for those processes whose choice rule is nearly best-response is related to equilibrium selection in symmetric \(2\times 2\) and \(n\times n\) coordination games”.
Reviewer: S.Gal (Haifa)

91A10 Noncooperative games
90C40 Markov and semi-Markov decision processes
91B62 Economic growth models
91A05 2-person games
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