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A characterization of the class of rationalizable equilibria of oligopoly games. (English) Zbl 0771.90018
Summary: The set of rationalizable strategies of a firm in a quantity-setting oligopoly is characterized. It is shown that as the number of firms in the industry increases, the rationalizable solution converges to the interval from zero to the monopoly output.

MSC:
91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A40 Other game-theoretic models
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