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A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games. (English) Zbl 1461.91037

Summary: This paper analyzes the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. This model includes the special case of observable mixed strategies.

MSC:

91A20 Multistage and repeated games
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