Roth, Alvin E.; Oliveira Sotomayor, Marilda A. Two-sided matching. A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis. (English) Zbl 0726.90003 Econometric Society Monographs, 18. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press. xiii, 263 p. £35.00; $ 54.50 (1990). This innovative monograph, partly based on earlier work of the authors, deals with the problem of matching considered from the game-theoretic point of view. Thus a matching can be in equilibrium, it may be stable, some problems lead to an (assignment) game which is then studied in detail etc. The book is devoted into four parts which deal, respectively, with the problems of one-to-one matching (marriage problem), one-to-many matching (firms-employees problem), one-to-one matching with money as a continuous variable, open problems, and proposes research directions. Particular questions considered in the monograph include incomplete information, complex preferences as well as concrete algorithms. Reviewer: A.Wieczorek (Warszawa) Cited in 4 ReviewsCited in 405 Documents MSC: 91-01 Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance 91B68 Matching models 91A40 Other game-theoretic models 05C20 Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments 05C70 Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) 90C27 Combinatorial optimization 05A05 Permutations, words, matrices Keywords:matching; marriage problem; firms-employees problem PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{A. E. Roth} and \textit{M. A. Oliveira Sotomayor}, Two-sided matching. A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press (1990; Zbl 0726.90003) References: [1] Gale, D.; Shapley, L.: College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. math. Monthly 69, 9-15 (1962) · Zbl 0109.24403 [2] Gusfield, D.; Irving, R. W.: The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms. (1989) · Zbl 0703.68046 [3] Knuth, D. E.: Marriages stables. (1976) [4] Mongell, S.; Roth, A. E.: Sorority rush as a two-sided matching mechanism. Amer. econ. Rev. 81, 441-464 (1991) [5] Roth, A. E.: The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory. J. polit. Econ. 92, 991-1016 (1984) [6] Roth, A. E.: New physicians: A natural experiment in market organization. Science 250, 1524-1528 (1990) [7] Roth, A. E.: A natural experiment in the organization of entry level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the UK. Amer. econ. Rev. 81, 415-440 (1991) [8] Roth, A. E.: Game theory as a part of empirical economics. Econ. J. 101, 107-114 (1991) This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.