Gary-Bobo, Robert J.; Michel, Philippe Informative advertising and competition: A noncooperative approach. (English) Zbl 0725.90016 Int. Econ. Rev. 32, No. 2, 321-339 (1991). Summary: The properties of informative advertising are studied in the context of an imperfectly competitive general equilibrium model of the Cournot- Walras type. Competitive conditions are created using the “replication technique”. It is shown that individually optimal advertising expenditures are zero if the number of agents is large enough in the economy. In other words, even in approximately competitive economies, the informative advertising phenomenon cannot be observed. Cited in 1 Document MSC: 91B50 General equilibrium theory 90B60 Marketing, advertising Keywords:informative advertising; imperfectly competitive general equilibrium model; optimal advertising PDFBibTeX XMLCite \textit{R. J. Gary-Bobo} and \textit{P. Michel}, Int. Econ. Rev. 32, No. 2, 321--339 (1991; Zbl 0725.90016) Full Text: DOI