Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods.

*(English)*Zbl 0722.90009The author considers an exchange model in which each agent has an initial endowment of one unit of an indivisible good. He constructs an incentive compatible procedure for achieving a competitive equilibrium.

##### MSC:

91B50 | General equilibrium theory |

91B60 | Trade models |

91B26 | Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models |

Full Text:
DOI

##### References:

[1] | Gale, David; Shapley, Lloyd S., College admissions and the stability of marriage, The American mathematical monthly, 69, 9-15, (1962) · Zbl 0109.24403 |

[2] | Ritz, Zvi, Incentives and stability in some two-sided economic and social models, (1982), in preparation |

[3] | Roth, Alvin E., The economics of matching: stability and incentives, Mathematics of operations research, (1982), forthcoming · Zbl 0496.90008 |

[4] | Roth, Alvin E.; Postlewaite, Andrew, Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods, Journal of mathematical economics, 4, 131-137, (1977) · Zbl 0368.90025 |

[5] | Shapley, Lloyd S.; Scarf, Herbert, On cores and indivisibility, Journal of mathematical economics, 1, 23-38, (1974) · Zbl 0281.90014 |

This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.