Group signatures without NIZK: from lattices in the standard model.

*(English)*Zbl 07162732
Ishai, Yuval (ed.) et al., Advances in cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2019. 38th annual international conference on the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques, Darmstadt, Germany, May 19–23, 2019. Proceedings. Part III. Cham: Springer (ISBN 978-3-030-17658-7/pbk; 978-3-030-17659-4/ebook). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 11478, 312-344 (2019).

Summary: In a group signature scheme, users can anonymously sign messages on behalf of the group they belong to, yet it is possible to trace the signer when needed. Since the first proposal of lattice-based group signatures in the random oracle model by Gordon, Katz, and Vaikuntanathan (ASIACRYPT 2010), the realization of them in the standard model from lattices has attracted much research interest, however, it has remained unsolved. In this paper, we make progress on this problem by giving the first such construction. Our schemes satisfy CCA-selfless anonymity and full traceability, which are the standard security requirements for group signatures proposed by Bellare, Micciancio, and Warinschi (EUROCRYPT 2003) with a slight relaxation in the anonymity requirement suggested by Camenisch and Groth (SCN 2004). We emphasize that even with this relaxed anonymity requirement, all previous group signature constructions rely on random oracles or NIZKs, where currently NIZKs are not known to be implied from lattice-based assumptions. We propose two constructions that provide tradeoffs regarding the security assumption and efficiency:

For the entire collection see [Zbl 1416.94012].

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- Our first construction is proven secure assuming the standard LWE and the SIS assumption. The sizes of the public parameters and the signatures grow linearly in the number of users in the system.
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- Our second construction is proven secure assuming the standard LWE and the subexponential hardness of the SIS problem. The sizes of the public parameters and the signatures are independent of the number of users in the system.

For the entire collection see [Zbl 1416.94012].

##### MSC:

94A60 | Cryptography |