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Cooperative equilibria in discounted stochastic sequential games. (English) Zbl 0681.90097

This paper addresses the problem of computation of cooperative equilibria in discounted stochastic sequential games. The proposed approach contains as a special case the method of E. J. Green and R. H. Porter [Econometrica 52, 87-100 (1984; Zbl 0526.90013)] (developed originally for repeated oligopoly games), but it is more general than the latter in the sense that it generates nontrivial equilibrium solutions for a much larger class of dynamic games. This fact is demonstrated on two examples, one concerned with duopolistic economics and the other with fishery management.
Reviewer: A.Haurie

MSC:

91A15 Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
91B62 Economic growth models
93B40 Computational methods in systems theory (MSC2010)
91A60 Probabilistic games; gambling
90C39 Dynamic programming
91A12 Cooperative games
91B24 Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91B76 Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
90-08 Computational methods for problems pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming
91A20 Multistage and repeated games

Citations:

Zbl 0526.90013
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References:

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