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Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-optimality. (English) Zbl 0666.90096

We consider the bargaining problem with a variable number of agents. The first author [J. Econ. Theory 45, No.2, 330-341 (1988; Zbl 0657.90106)] had previously characterized the Nash solution as the only solution to satisfy the following axioms: Pareto Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, and Multilateral Stability. We show that the disagreement solution is the only additional solution to satisfy the restricted list of axioms obtained by dropping Pareto Optimality.
Reviewer: D.Kovenock

MSC:

91A12 Cooperative games

Citations:

Zbl 0657.90106
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References:

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