Stability and the Nash solution.

*(English)*Zbl 0657.90106The author deals with the usual Nash bargaining n-person scheme and proves that the Nash solution can be characterized by the set of axioms differing from Nash’s axioms only by replacing the Axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives by Harsanyi’s Axiom of Multilateral Stability (the remaining axioms are: Pareto Optimality, Anonymity and Scale Invariance). The paper also deals with variants of the main result.

Reviewer: A.Wieczorek

##### Keywords:

Nash bargaining n-person scheme; Nash solution; Axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives; Axiom of Multilateral Stability; Pareto Optimality; Anonymity; Scale Invariance
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\textit{T. Lensberg}, J. Econ. Theory 45, No. 2, 330--341 (1988; Zbl 0657.90106)

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