zbMATH — the first resource for mathematics

Cournot duopoly with two production periods. (English) Zbl 0627.90009
A duopoly model is considered where production is chosen in two periods before it is taken to the market so that the resulting game has two stages. It is shown that the subgame perfect equilibria are those corresponding to worst Stackelberg outcomes.
Reviewer: H.Keiding

91B24 Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91A40 Other game-theoretic models
91A10 Noncooperative games
Full Text: DOI
[1] Dixit, A.K, The role of investment in entry deterrence, Economic J., 90, 95-106, (1980)
[2] Friedman, J.W, Oligopoly theory, (1983), Cambridge Univ. Press Cambridge · Zbl 0385.90001
[3] Kreps, D.M; Scheinkman, J.A, Quantity precommitment and bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes, Bell J. econ., 14, 326-337, (1983)
[4] Saloner, G, The role of obsolescence and inventory costs in providing commitment, Intermat. J. industr. organiz., 4, 333-345, (1986)
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.