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Predictive superiority of the beta-characteristic function in cooperative non-sidepayment n-person games. (English) Zbl 0605.90142
This article reports an experimental study of decision-making outcomes in cooperative non-sidepayment games. The objective of this test was to determine which characteristic function, \(V_{\alpha}(S)\) or \(V_{\beta}(S)\), provides the most accurate basis for payoff predictions from solution concepts. The experiment tested three solution concepts (core, stable set, imputation set) in the context of 5-person, 2-strategy non-sidepayment games. Predictions from each of the three solution concepts were computed on the basis of both \(V_{\alpha}(S)\) and \(V_{\beta}(S)\), making a total of six predictive theories under test. Consistent with earlier studies [H. A. Michener, D. C. Dettman and Y. C. Choi, in: Advances in Group Processes 1, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT (1984); H. A. Michener, D. C. Dettman, J. M. Ekman and Y. C. Choi, ”A comparison of the alpha- and beta characteristic functions in cooperative non-sidepayment n-person games”, Techn. Report, Dept. of Sociology, Univ. of Wisconsin at Madison (1985)], two basic findings emerged. First, the data show that for each of the solutions tested, the prediction from any solution concept computed from \(V_{\beta}(S)\) was more accurate than the prediction from the same solution concept computed from \(V_{\alpha}(S)\). Second, the \(\beta\)- core was the most accurate of the six theories tested. Overall, these results support the view that \(V_{\beta}(S)\) is superior to \(V_{\alpha}(S)\) as a basis for payoff predictions in cooperative non- sidepayment games.
91A12 Cooperative games
91D99 Mathematical sociology (including anthropology)
91E99 Mathematical psychology
Full Text: DOI
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