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Formal theories of knowledge in AI and robotics. (English) Zbl 0596.68061
Theories of knowledge representation are described in abstract fashions. First, the theory of epistemic logic (EL) is briefly reviewed, distinguishing it from ordinary logics in an operator K called the knowledge operator (Kp, for instance, is read ”The agent knows a fact p.”) and in the semantics of the logic. Special axioms and rules are provided involving the operator K. Dynamic logic (DL) similar to EL is also introduced in order to describe actions. Then two approaches are introduced, which are necessary in dealing with knowledge and actions required. One is the interpreted-symbolic-structures approach and the other the situated-automata approach. In the latter approach, an intelligent system considered is regarded as an automaton which recognizes its surroundings and gives necessary responses. In both approaches, EL and DL play fundamental roles. It is mentioned that some of the ideas described are already being applied to the author’s robot research.
Reviewer: Y.Sakai

MSC:
68T99 Artificial intelligence
68T05 Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence
68Q65 Abstract data types; algebraic specification
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