Rationalizable strategic behavior. (English) Zbl 0552.90098

Bernheim, B. Douglas

Econometrica 52, 1007-1028 (1984).

Summary: This paper examines the nature of rational choice in strategic games. Although there are many reasons why an agent might select a Nash equilibrium strategy in a particular game, rationality alone does not require him to do so. A natural extension of widely accepted axioms for rational choice under uncertainty to strategic environments generates an alternative class of strategies, labelled rationalizable. It is argued that no “rationalizable strategy” can be discarded on the basis of rationality alone, and that all rationally justifiable strategies are members of the rationalizable set. The properties of rationalizable strategies are studied, and refinements are considered.

MSC:

91A10	Noncooperative games
91A26	Rationality and learning in game theory

Keywords:

rational choice in strategic games