×

zbMATH — the first resource for mathematics

Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. (English) Zbl 0523.90099

MSC:
91A12 Cooperative games
PDF BibTeX XML Cite
Full Text: DOI
References:
[1] Chatterjee, K, Incentive compatibility in bargaining under uncertainty, (1980), Pennsylvania State University, To appear in Quarterly Journal of Economics
[2] Chatterjee, K; Samuelson, W, The simple economics of bargaining, (1979), Pennsylvania State University and Boston University, To appear in Operations Research
[3] D’Aspremont, C; Gerard-Varet, L, Incentives and incomplete information, J. pub. econom., 11, 25-45, (1979)
[4] Laffont, J.-J; Maskin, E, A differential approach to expected utility maximizing mechanisms, (), 289-308
[5] Myerson, R.B, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica, 47, 61-73, (1979) · Zbl 0399.90008
[6] Myerson, R.B, Optimal auction design, Math. oper. res., 6, 58-73, (1981) · Zbl 0496.90099
[7] Vickrey, W, Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, J. finance, 16, 8-37, (1961)
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.