Fudenberg, Drew; Tirole, Jean Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility. (English) Zbl 0521.90025 J. Econ. Theory 31, 227-250 (1983). Page: −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 ±0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 Show Scanned Page Cited in 1 ReviewCited in 19 Documents MSC: 91B24 Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) Keywords:strategic investment; no-discounting; mobility deterrence; existence of a set of perfect equilibria; discounting; market entrance PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. Fudenberg} and \textit{J. Tirole}, J. Econ. Theory 31, 227--250 (1983; Zbl 0521.90025) Full Text: DOI References: [1] Caves, R; Porter, M, From entry barriers to mobility barriers, Quart. J. econ., 9, 241-267, (1977) [2] Dixit, A, A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers, Bell. J. econ., 10, 20-32, (1979) [3] Dixit, A, The role of investment in entry deterrence, Econ. J., 90, 95-106, (1980) [4] Fudenberg, D; Levine, D, Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite and infinite-horizon games, J. econ. theory, 31, 251-268, (1983) · Zbl 0521.90106 [5] Fudenberg, D; Tirole, J, Dynamic models of oligopoly, () · Zbl 0743.90010 [6] Fudenberg, D; Tirole, J, Learning by doing and market performance, (1981), University of California Berkeley, mimeo [7] Fudenberg, D; Tirole, J, Preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology, (1983), University of California Berkeley, mimeo · Zbl 0566.90014 [8] Harsanyi, J.C, A general solution for finite non-cooperative games, based on risk dominance, (), 627-650, Princeton, N.J. · Zbl 0129.34504 [9] Kreps, D; Wilson, R, Sequential equilibria, Econometrica, 50, 863-894, (1982) · Zbl 0483.90092 [10] Kydland, F.E, Equilibrium solutions in dynamic dominant player models, J. econ. theory, 15, 307-324, (1977) · Zbl 0375.90089 [11] Maskin, E; Newbery, D, Rational expectations and market power: the paradox of the disadvantageous Tariff in oil, MIT working paper no. 227, (November 1978) [12] Maskin, E; Tirole, J, The dynamic of oligopoly and industries with large fixed costs, (1982), MIT, mimeo [13] Papadopolous, N, Growth in a new market, (March 1980), Harvard University, mimeo [14] Schelling, T.C, The strategy of conflict, (1960), Harvard Univ. Press Cambridge, Massachussets [15] Schmalensee, R, Economics of scale and barriers to entry, J. polit. econ., 89, 1128-1238, (1981) [16] Selten, R, Spieltheoretische behandlung eines oligopolmodells mit nachfrageträgheit, Z. ges. staatswiss., 12, (1965) [17] Selten, R, Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games, Internat. J. game theory, 1, 25-55, (1975) · Zbl 0312.90072 [18] Spence, A.M, Entry, capacity, investment and oligopolistic pricing, Bell J. econ., 8, 534-544, (1977) [19] Spence, A.M, Investment strategy and growth in a new market, Bell J. econ., 10, 1-19, (1979) [20] Starr, A.W; Ho, Y.L, Further properties of nonzero-Sun-differential games, J. optim. theory appl., 3, 207-219, (1969) · Zbl 0169.12303 This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.