Kreps, David M.; Milgrom, Paul; Roberts, John; Wilson, Robert Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma. (English) Zbl 0485.90092 J. Econ. Theory 27, 245-252 (1982). Page: −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 ±0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 Show Scanned Page Cited in 1 ReviewCited in 145 Documents MSC: 91A15 Stochastic games, stochastic differential games Keywords:rational cooperation; finking; Nash equilibrium; incomplete information; finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma PDF BibTeX XML Cite \textit{D. M. Kreps} et al., J. Econ. Theory 27, 245--252 (1982; Zbl 0485.90092) Full Text: DOI References: [1] Axelrod, R, The emergence of cooperation among egoists, Amer. Pol. sci. rev., 75, 306-318, (1981) [2] Kreps, D; Wilson, R, Reputation and imperfect information, J. econ. theory, 27, 253-279, (1982) · Zbl 0485.90093 [3] \scD. Kreps and R. Wilson, Sequential equilibrium, Econometrica, in press. · Zbl 0483.90092 [4] Milgrom, P; Roberts, J, Predation, reputation and entry deterrence, J. econ. theory, 27, 280-312, (1982) · Zbl 0485.90013 [5] Smale, S, The Prisoner’s dilemma and dynamical systems associated to non-cooperative games, Econometrica, 48, 1617-1634, (1980) · Zbl 0463.90099 This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.