zbMATH — the first resource for mathematics

Remarks on the game-theoretic analysis of a simple distribution of surplus problem. (English) Zbl 0476.90011

91B50 General equilibrium theory
91A40 Other game-theoretic models
91A12 Cooperative games
91B38 Production theory, theory of the firm
Full Text: DOI
[1] Aumann, R.: Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders. Econometrica43, 1975, 611–646. · Zbl 0325.90082
[2] Aumann, R., andR. Shapley: Values of Non-atomic Games, Princeton 1974. · Zbl 0311.90084
[3] Champsaur, P.: Cooperation vs. Competition. J. Econ. Theory11, 1975a, 394–417. · Zbl 0327.90035
[4] –: How to Share the Cost of a Public Good. International J. Game Theory4, 1975b, 113–129. · Zbl 0318.90012
[5] Debreu, G.: Least Concave Utility Functions. J. Math. Econ.3, 1976, 121–129. · Zbl 0361.90007
[6] Kannai, Y.: Concavifiability and Constructions of Concave Utility Functions. J. Math. Econ.4, 1977, 1–56. · Zbl 0361.90008
[7] Kurz, M.: Distortion of Preferences, Income Distribution and the Case for a Linear Income Tax. J. Econ. Theory14, 1977, 292–298. · Zbl 0375.90099
[8] Mas-Colell, A.: Competitive and Value Allocations of Large Exchange Economies. J. Econ. Theory14, 1977, 419–438. · Zbl 0376.90026
[9] Oddou, C.: Theoremes d’Existence et d’Equivalence pour des Economies avec Production. Econometrica44, 1976, 265–283. · Zbl 0329.90016
[10] Pratt, J.: Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. Econometrica32, 1964, 122–136. · Zbl 0132.13906
[11] Scarf, H., with the collaboration ofT. Hansen: The Computation of Economic Equilibria. New Haven 1973. · Zbl 0311.90009
[12] Shapley, L.: Utility Comparisons and the Theory of Games. La Decisi√≥n. Ed. by G. Guilbaud. Paris 1969. · Zbl 0218.90088
[13] Shapley, L., andM. Shubik: Pure Competition, Coalitional Power and Fair Division. International Econ. Review10, 1969, 337–363.
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. It attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming the completeness or perfect precision of the matching.