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Network games with incomplete information. (English) Zbl 1368.91044
Summary: We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. Players receive different correlated signals and they make inferences about other players’ information. We demonstrate that there exists a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium by disentangling the information effects from the network effects and show that the equilibrium effort of each agent is a weighted combinations of different Katz-Bonacich centralities.

91A43 Games involving graphs
91D30 Social networks; opinion dynamics
Full Text: DOI
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