×

Tolerance-based punishment and cooperation in spatial public goods game. (English) Zbl 1394.91050

Summary: Punishment, as a remarkable way, has been proposed to explain the emergence and persistence of cooperation in the human species. Inspired by the fact that people have a certain tolerance for free-riders before punishment, therefore, we study the effect of tolerance-based punishment on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game. Cooperators punish defectors on the basis of the tolerance threshold during the evolutionary process and have to bear the relevant costs of sanction subsequently. Different from previous works, the new mechanism can reduce the frequency of punishing by controlling the tolerance for punishment. We find that this mechanism can lead to synergistic effects, and it can stabilize the circumstance of full cooperation under adverse conditions. By means of analysis of the emergence of cooperative clusters, we demonstrate that the tolerance-based punishment can promote cooperation through enhancing spatial reciprocity. In addition, the readiness of cooperation increases obviously by adjusting this kind of punishment. Our work extends the form of punishment in the evolution of spatial public goods game and the results are conducive to a better understanding of punishment.

MSC:

91A22 Evolutionary games
91A43 Games involving graphs
91B18 Public goods
PDFBibTeX XMLCite
Full Text: DOI

References:

[1] Milinski, M.; Semmann, D.; Krambeck, H. J.; Marotzke, J., Stabilizing the earth’s climate is not a losing game: supporting evidence from public goods experiments, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 103, 3994-3998, (2006)
[2] Sigmund, K., Punish or perish? retaliation and collaboration among humans, Trends Ecol Evol, 22, 593-600, (2007)
[3] Fehr, E.; Gächter, S., Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments, Am Econ Rev, 90, 980-994, (2000)
[4] Perc, M.; Szolnoki, A., Self-organization of punishment in structured populations, New J Phys, 14, 043013, (2012)
[5] Brandt, H.; Hauert, C.; Sigmund, K., Punishment and reputation in spatial public goods games, Proc R Soc Lond B, 270, 1099-1104, (2003)
[6] Wang, Z.; Bauch, C. T.; Bhattacharyya, S.; d’Onofrio, A.; Manfredi, P.; Perc, M.; Perra, N.; Salathé, M.; Zhao, D., Statistical physics of vaccination, Phys Rep, 664, 1-113, (2016) · Zbl 1359.92111
[7] Nowak, M. A.; May, R. M., Evolutionary games and spatial chaos, Nature, 359, 826-829, (1992)
[8] Perc, M.; Szolnoki, A., Coevolutionary games-a mini review, Biosystems, 99, 109-125, (2010)
[9] Wu, Y.; Chang, S.; Zhang, Z.; Deng, Z., Impact of social reward on the evolution of cooperation behavior in the complex networks, Sci Rep, 7, 41076, (2017)
[10] Szolnoki, A.; Perc, M.; Szabó, G., Topology-independent impact of noise on cooperation in spatial public goods games, Phys Rev E, 80, 5, 056109, (2009)
[11] Szabó, G.; Hauert, C., Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games, Phys Rev Lett, 89, 118101, (2002)
[12] Hardin, G., The tragedy of the commons, Science, 162, 1243-1248, (1968)
[13] Rand, D. G.; Dreber, A.; Ellingsen, T.; Fudenberg, D.; Nowak, M. A., Positive interactions promote public cooperation, Science, 325, 1272-1275, (2009) · Zbl 1226.91018
[14] Szolnoki, A.; Perc, M., Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game, EPL, 92, 38003, (2010)
[15] Sigmund, K.; Hauert, C.; Nowak, M. A., Reward and punishment, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 98, 10757-10762, (2001)
[16] Wang, Z.; Wang, L.; Yin, Z. Y.; Xia, C. Y., Inferring reputation promotes the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemma games, PLoS ONE, 7, e40218, (2012)
[17] Cao, X.-B.; Du, W.-B.; Rong, Z.-H., The evolutionary public goods game on scale-free networks with heterogeneous investment, Physica A, 389, 1273-1280, (2010)
[18] Andreoni, J.; Harbaugh, W.; Vesterlund, L., The carrot or the stick: rewards, punishments, and cooperation, Am Econ Rev, 93, 893-902, (2003)
[19] Santos, F. C.; Santos, M. D.; Pacheco, J. M., Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games, Nature, 454, 213-216, (2008)
[20] Wang, J.; Fu, F.; Wang, L., Effects of heterogeneous wealth distribution on public cooperation with collective risk, Phys Rev E, 82, 016102, (2010)
[21] Xia, C. Y.; Meloni, S.; Perc, M.; Moreno, Y., Dynamic instability of cooperation due to diverse activity patterns in evolutionary social dilemmas, EPL, 109, 58002, (2015)
[22] Szabó, G.; Fáth, G., Evolutionary games on graphs, Phys Rep, 446, 97-216, (2007)
[23] Hintze, A.; Adami, C., Punishment in public goods games leads to meta-stable phase transitions and hysteresis, Phys Biol, 12, 046005, (2015)
[24] Gürerk, Ö.; Irlenbusch, B.; Rockenbach, B., The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions, Science, 312, 108-111, (2006)
[25] Deng, X.; Zhang, Z.; Deng, Y.; Liu, Q.; Chang, S., Self-adaptive win-stay-lose-shift reference selection mechanism promotes cooperation on a square lattice, Appl Math Comput, 284, 322-331, (2016)
[26] Perc, M.; Gómez-Gardeñes, J.; Szolnoki, A.; Floría, L. M.; Moreno, Y., Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review, J R Soc Interface, 10, 20120997, (2013)
[27] Perc, M.; Jordan, J. J.; Rand, D. G.; Wang, Z.; Boccaletti, S.; Szolnoki, A., Statistical physics of human cooperation, Phys Rep, 687, 1-51, (2017) · Zbl 1366.80006
[28] Wang, L.; Wu, J. T., Characterizing the dynamics underlying global spread of epidemics, Nat Commun, 9, 218, (2018)
[29] Jin, Q.; Wang, L.; Xia, C. Y.; Wang, Z., Spontaneous symmetry breaking in interdependent networked game, Sci Rep, 4, 4095, (2014)
[30] Szolnoki, A.; Perc, M., Impact of critical mass on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games, Phys Rev E, 81, 057101, (2010)
[31] Chen, X.; Wang, L., Promotion of cooperation induced by appropriate payoff aspirations in a small-world networked game, Phys Rev E, 77, 017103, (2008)
[32] Wang, Z.; Szolnoki, A.; Perc, M., Evolution of public cooperation on interdependent networks: the impact of biased utility functions, EPL, 97, 48001, (2012)
[33] Battiston, F.; Perc, M.; Latora, V., Determinants of public cooperation in multiplex networks, New J Phys, 19, 073017, (2017)
[34] Wang, Z.; Wang, L.; Szolnoki, A.; Perc, M., Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: a colloquium, Eur Phys J B, 88, 124, (2015)
[35] Wang, Z.; Andrews, M. A.; Wu, Z.-X.; Wang, L.; Bauch, C. T., Coupled disease-behavior dynamics on complex networks: a review, Phys Life Rev, 15, 1-29, (2015)
[36] Wang, Z.; Wang, L.; Perc, M., Degree mixing in multilayer networks impedes the evolution of cooperation, Phys Rev E, 89, 052813, (2014)
[37] Raihani, N. J.; McAuliffe, K., Human punishment is motivated by inequity aversion, not a desire for reciprocity, Biol Lett, 8, 802-804, (2012)
[38] Gächter, S.; Renner, E.; Sefton, M., The long-run benefits of punishment, Science, 322, (2008)
[39] Fowler, J. H., Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 102, 7047-7049, (2005)
[40] Helbing, D.; Szolnoki, A.; Perc, M.; Szabó, G., Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game, New J Phys, 12, 083005, (2010)
[41] Yang, H.-X.; Rong, Z., Mutual punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game, Chaos Solitons Fract, 77, 230-234, (2015) · Zbl 1353.91017
[42] Rand, D. G.; Armao IV, J. J.; Nakamaru, M.; Ohtsuki, H., Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation, J Theor Biol, 265, 624-632, (2010)
[43] Szolnoki, A.; Perc, M., Second-order free-riding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment, Phys Rev X, 7, 041027, (2017)
[44] Clutton-Brock, T. H.; Parker, G. A., Punishment in animal societies, Nature, 373, 209-216, (1995)
[45] Fehr, E.; Gächter, S., Altruistic punishment in humans, Nature, 415, 137-140, (2002)
[46] Szolnoki, A.; Szabó, G.; Perc, M., Phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with pool punishment, Phys Rev E, 83, 036101, (2011)
[47] Sigmund, K.; De Silva, H.; Traulsen, A.; Hauert, C., Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons, Nature, 466, 861-863, (2010)
[48] Szolnoki, A.; Szabó, G.; Czakö, L., Competition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games, Phys Rev E, 84, 046106, (2011)
[49] Cubitt, R. P.; Drouvelis, M.; Gchter, S., Framing and free riding: emotional responses and punishment in social dilemma games, Exp Econ, 14, 254-272, (2011)
[50] Wedekind, C.; Milinski, M., Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating prisoner’s dilemma: pavlov versus generous tit-for-tat, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 93, 2686-2689, (1996)
[51] Szolnoki, A.; Perc, M., Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation, J Theor Biol, 325, 34-41, (2013) · Zbl 1314.91183
[52] Szolnoki, A.; Perc, M., Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game, New J Phys, 18, 083021, (2016)
[53] Gao, J.; Li, Z.; Cong, R.; Wang, L., Tolerance-based punishment in continuous public goods game, Physica A, 391, 4111-4120, (2012)
[54] Dreber, A.; Rand, D. G.; Fudenberg, D.; Nowak, M. A., Winners don’t punish, Nature, 452, 348-351, (2008)
[55] Xia, C.; Miao, Q.; Zhang, J., Impact of neighborhood separation on the spatial reciprocity in the prisoner’s dilemma game, Chaos Solitons Fract, 51, 22-30, (2013) · Zbl 1294.91027
[56] Santos, M.; Ferreira, A. L.; Figueiredo, W., Phase diagram and criticality of the two-dimensional prisoner’s dilemma model, Phys Rev E, 96, 012120, (2017)
[57] Perc, M., Stability of subsystem solutions in agent-based models, Eur J Phys, 39, 014001, (2018)
[58] Perc, M., High-performance parallel computing in the classroom using the public goods game as an example, Eur J Phys, 38, 045801, (2017)
[59] Perc, M., Phase transitions in models of human cooperation, Phys Lett A, 380, 2803-2808, (2016)
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.