The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model. (English) Zbl 0971.91509

Wang, YunTong

Econ. Lett. 64, No. 2, 187-192 (1999).

Summary: The paper considers the discrete cost sharing model first studied in H. Moulin’s paper [“On additive methods to share joint costs”, Jpn. Econ. Rev. 46, No. 4, 303–332 (1995; doi:10.1111/j.1468-5876.1995.tb00024.x)]. It shows that the set of additive rules satisfying the dummy axiom is the set of all convex combinations of the path generated rules.

MSC:

91B32	Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
91A12	Cooperative games

Keywords:

cost sharing; additivity; dummy axioms

References:

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